Showing posts with label 1908. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1908. Show all posts

Sunday, June 13, 2010

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2

Ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing, selling, marketing, advertising or in any manner using the trademarks 'SUPER BRIGHT', SUPER BRIGHT EL', 'SUPER BRIGHT EL-C, 'SUPER BRIGHT EL-81', 'SUPER BRIGHT HD ULTRA' and 'SUPER BRIGHT Bleach' or any other trademark which is deceptively similar or confusingly similar to that of the plaintiff.

Held that in action of passing off it has to be proved that the person to whom the goods were supplied would have been deceived into believing that the goods were that of the plaintiff when in fact they were not. Defendant supplying the rogue product , applying the plaintiffs trade mark 'SUPER BRIGHT. Fit case for likely loss of goodwill and reputation by the plaintiff if the injunction was not granted.
Plaintiffs were able to show prima facie that they are the prior users of the mark and that they have made out a prima facie case for grant of an ad interim injunction in their favour.
Injunction granted.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Section 9
Suit for banning/issuing an injunction on publication of a book, which is in existence and being published and read for last 135 years, on the ground that its publication was likely to disturb public tranquility and public order.

HELD Plaintiffs, after 135 years wanted to use it as a tool to cause damage to the society. Such kind of suits are not of civil nature and are purely of religious nature .
In such a situation the Court could not have entertained the suit for injunction dismissed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Plaintiffs owners of RANGOLI which is a registered trademark regarding Essence stick .
Defendant also using word RANGILI for sale of Essence stick therefore using phonetically and visually similar mark as that of registered trademark of the plaintiffs . Fit case for Interim injunction .
HELD
Thus, phonetical similarity was alleged and it has been decided by the trial court and therefore, the contention raised by the original defendants that phonetical similarity cannot be argued by the present appellants before this Court is not accepted. On the contrary, injunction ought to have been granted, looking to the mark RANGILI, which is structurally and phonetically similar to registered Trademrk of plaintiffs viz. 'RANGOLI'. Mark 'RANGILI' is deceptively similar to registered Trademark RANGOLI. A man of imperfect recollection and of average inteli will be deceived by mark used by the defendants. [Para 4]

As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, this Appeal from Order is allowed. The order dated 5th November, 2007 beh Notice of Motion exhs. 6 and 7 in Civil Suit No. 2175 of 2007 passed by the learnt Judge, City Civil Court, Court No. 6, Ahmedabad is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents (original defendants), their servants, agents, dealers, distributor; stockists, publishers and printers are hereby restrained from using any label, materials, advertisement materials, the mark RANGILI, on and after a period of eight weeks from today. Appeal From Order is allowed. Civil Application No. of 2007 stands disposed of. [Para 5]

Friday, June 11, 2010

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 11 Rules 1 and 12
HELD "The entire case of the revision petitioner rests on the basis of their enquiry conducted in the matter which resulted in getting the alleged information about the imitations of their branded pen both in design and in shape. Therefore before granting permission to serve the interrogatories, the trial Court was expected to look into the questions for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion as to whether the revision petitioner should be compelled to disclose their nature of evidence in the suit. It is trite that a party is not entitled to serve interrogatories with a view to collect materials which would constitute the evidence of the opposite party. This provision is not a short cut for a party to win the case. The order of the trial Judge does not disclose that the basic requirements for permitting' service of interrogatories were considered in the matter.
The suit is also ripe for trial and in such circumstances, whether it was necessary to deliver the interrogatories with the questions as contained in the application in IA. No. 25 of 2002 was also not considered by the learned trial Judge. Therefore I am of the view that the entire issue need to be considered by the learned trial Judge afresh."
Impugned order set aside.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 7 Rule 11

Return of the plaint sought on the grounds that constituted attorney is an advocate in the same case.
HELD " I am of the view that the issue of dual capacity as raised by the applicants is mere a technical irregularity, which does not affect the root cause of the issue as raised in the original suit, it would not cause any prejudice to the non-applicants if allowed to get cured. There is no legal bar to an advocate being appointed as a constituted attorney by a party for the purpose of a case. Moreover there is no suggestion of there being any mala fide."

Application dismissed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rule 3
HELD" that for passing an ex parte order the Court is required to record reasons that the object of injunction would be defeated by delay. No such reason and indeed no reason whatsoever has been recorded in the impugned order. Furthermore, we have noticed the fact that on merits also the appellant had issued a legal notice to the respondents in the year 2003, the reply to which did not state that the application for registration, filed by the respondent was in the year 1996, though it was stated in the said reply that the i user of the respondent/plaintiff was from the year 1992. In these circumstances, the veracity of the averment regarding the application of 1996 filed by the respondent/plaintiff was required to be looked into seriously before any order was passed granting an injunction which stops the business of the appellant in the disputed product."
Order of the learned Single Judge, set aside.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2
Plaintiff obtaining ex parte injunction by completely suppressing in the plaint that vide written agreements dated 19th August, 2002 and 20th September, 2002 (filed by the defendant No. 2 along with written statement), the plaintiff had agreed to be the authorised stockist of the defendants and the said agreements were executed on the letter-head of the defendants, which clearly mentioned the name/mark 'PRINCE Auto Industries'.
Howevre plaintiff using the distinctive trademark 'PRINCE' in respect of accessories for use in cars as registered owner. Defendant had been dealing in auto accessories and had made a mark in its field of activity well before the plaintiff got registered the trademark 'PRINCE'
Conduct of the plaintiff unbecoming of the confidence impliedly imposed by the Court in a plaintioff to state material facts.

HELD Sale figures of the defendant No.2 were nearly four times the sale figures of the plaintiff Interim orders, vacated alongwith other directions.

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
If we go by the family settlement/arrangement, there is a primafacie, case in favour of the appellants who are plaintiffs in two civil suits, as, after 31.3.96, the respondents are not entitled to use the trade mark "Kangaro". If we go only by the Retirement Deeds, excluding the family settlement/arrangement from consideration, the respondents who are plaintiffs in one suit have a prima facie case to exclusive use of the trademark "Kangaro". Keeping in view the fact that (i) trade mark "Kangaro" was being used more or less as a family trademark till 31.3.1995; (ii) both the groups are using this trademark since prior to 7.1.1997, when status quo order was passed; (iii) No serious effort was made by the respondents for vacation of status quo order dated 7.1.1997, even after dismissal of SLP of the appellants in the proceedings arising out of CO. No. 4/97; (iv) both the groups have substantial turnover from use of the trademark "Kangaro", though turnover of the respondents is stated to be much brighter than that of the appellants, (v) In some countries the appellants are using this trade mark while in some other countries it is being used by the respondents; (vi) the court can take a final view on the nature, admissibility and applicability of the documents termed as family settlement/arrangement by the appellants and proposal/counter proposal, by the respondents, only after recording evidence, to be adduced during trial, we direct as under:
(1) During pendency of these suits, the parties shall maintain the status quo, as it existed on 7.1.1997, as regards use of the trademark "Kangaro", but, in order to ensure that there is no confusion as regards the manufacturer of the product they shall also prominently display the name of the manufacturer on the box in which the product reaches the ultimate customer.
(2) Both the groups shall maintain and file, in court, quarterly un-audited accounts of the turnover, gross profit and not profit from manufacture and sale of the products sold by them under the trademark "Kangaro", so that the group which ultimately succeeds can recover suitable damages from the other group. The accounts should be filed within 90 days of the close of each quarter. They shall also file annual audited accounts, containing the same information, by 30th June each year. The Appeals stand disposed of. The observations made in this order shall not affect or influence the decision of the suits on merit.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Respondent/Plaintiff doing the business under the name of KHAZANA for the past 20 years whereas ppellant carrying on the business under the name of Lakshmi Gold KHAZAANA only from September, 2007 Long usage of the name KHAZAN by respondents. Therefore appellant/ defendant deceptively passing off goods namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of plaintiffs/respondents registered trade mark . Respondent already registered owners of mark rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA .
HELD Totality of the evidence placed by the respondent/plaintiff before the Court prima facie makes out a case, supporting the plea of the plaintiff that the appellant/defendant is deceptively passing off goods-namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of laintiffs/respondents registered trade mark, which actions or state of affairs if allowed to continue at this stage, will tantamount to an action for infringement of Trade Mark, especially in the circumstance, when not only the respondent has already acquired the proprietary rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA, but also when the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondent in obtaining injunction pending suit. Under such circumstances, the appeals have got to be dismissed since they do not carry any merit. [Paras 11 & 12;

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Respondent/Plaintiff doing the business under the name of KHAZANA for the past 20 years whereas ppellant carrying on the business under the name of Lakshmi Gold KHAZAANA only from September, 2007 Long usage of the name KHAZAN by respondents. Therefore appellant/ defendant deceptively passing off goods namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of plaintiffs/respondents registered trade mark . Respondent already registered owners of mark rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA .
HELD Totality of the evidence placed by the respondent/plaintiff before the Court prima facie makes out a case, supporting the plea of the plaintiff that the appellant/defendant is deceptively passing off goods-namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of laintiffs/respondents registered trade mark, which actions or state of affairs if allowed to continue at this stage, will tantamount to an action for infringement of Trade Mark, especially in the circumstance, when not only the respondent has already acquired the proprietary rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA, but also when the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondent in obtaining injunction pending suit. Under such circumstances, the appeals have got to be dismissed since they do not carry any merit.
[Paras 11 & 12;

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Respondent/Plaintiff doing the business under the name of KHAZANA for the past 20 years whereas ppellant carrying on the business under the name of Lakshmi Gold KHAZAANA only from September, 2007 Long usage of the name KHAZAN by respondents. Therefore appellant/ defendant deceptively passing off goods namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of plaintiffs/respondents registered trade mark . Respondent already registered owners of mark rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA .
HELD Totality of the evidence placed by the respondent/plaintiff before the Court prima facie makes out a case, supporting the plea of the plaintiff that the appellant/defendant is deceptively passing off goods-namely jewelleries or attempting or likely to attempt to pass off such goods as similar to that of laintiffs/respondents registered trade mark, which actions or state of affairs if allowed to continue at this stage, will tantamount to an action for infringement of Trade Mark, especially in the circumstance, when not only the respondent has already acquired the proprietary rights by long usage of the word KHAZANA, but also when the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondent in obtaining injunction pending suit. Under such circumstances, the appeals have got to be dismissed since they do not carry any merit.
[Paras 11 & 12;

Saturday, May 29, 2010

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 17 Rule 1(2) — When the hearing of the suit has commenced, it shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that, for exceptional reasons to be recorded by it the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is necessary — Instead of deciding the case at the interlocutory stage, the suit itself should be disposed of finally at a very early date.
Infringement of patents — Interim order — Suit pending for long time — Suits relating to the matters of patents, trademarks and copyrights are pending for years and years and litigation is mainly fought between the parties about the temporary injunction — Matters relating to trademarks, copyrights and patents should be finally decided very expeditiously by the Trial Court instead of merely granting or refusing to grant injunction
Respondent shall be entitled to sell its product but it shall maintain an accurate records/accounts of its all India and export sales — No adjournment whatsoever ordinarily will be granted and the suit shall be finally disposed of on or before 30th November, 2009.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order 7 Rule 11 read with Trade Marks Act, 1999 Sections 134 and 135

Application of defendants for Rejection of plaint HELD adjudicating upon an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it being settled law that the averments made in the plaint must be taken to be correct for the purpose of adjudicating upon such an application. The remaining facts as to whether the Managing Trustee was not authorized to file the present suit on account of the fact that he had been removed as Managing Trustee by a resolution dated 22.04.2009 and as to the reasons for his removal, these are matters which have to be decided upon after evidence is adduced by both the parties. Application dismissed.
Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Since the entire action instituted by the plaintiff-trust is on the basis that the defendants have started manufacturing and marketing various types of fans using the impugned trademark 'CINNI that already stood assigned to the plaintiff-Trust, the interim orders passed by this Court on 1st May, 2009, restraining the defendant No. 2 from interfering with the business of the plaintiff in terms of the assignment deed dated 05.11.2000 and further restraining the said defendant from transferring the impugned trademark 'CINNI that stood assigned to the plaintiff-trust by the aforesaid assignment deed in favour of any third party except the plaintiff-trust, appear to be wholly justified, and are made absolute.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order 7 Rule 11 read with Trade Marks Act, 1999 Sections 134 and 135

Application of defendants for Rejection of plaint HELD adjudicating upon an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it being settled law that the averments made in the plaint must be taken to be correct for the purpose of adjudicating upon such an application. The remaining facts as to whether the Managing Trustee was not authorized to file the present suit on account of the fact that he had been removed as Managing Trustee by a resolution dated 22.04.2009 and as to the reasons for his removal, these are matters which have to be decided upon after evidence is adduced by both the parties. Application dismissed.
Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Since the entire action instituted by the plaintiff-trust is on the basis that the defendants have started manufacturing and marketing various types of fans using the impugned trademark 'CINNI that already stood assigned to the plaintiff-Trust, the interim orders passed by this Court on 1st May, 2009, restraining the defendant No. 2 from interfering with the business of the plaintiff in terms of the assignment deed dated 05.11.2000 and further restraining the said defendant from transferring the impugned trademark 'CINNI that stood assigned to the plaintiff-trust by the aforesaid assignment deed in favour of any third party except the plaintiff-trust, appear to be wholly justified, and are made absolute.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order 7 Rule 11 read with Trade Marks Act, 1999 Sections 134 and 135

Application of defendants for Rejection of plaint HELD adjudicating upon an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it being settled law that the averments made in the plaint must be taken to be correct for the purpose of adjudicating upon such an application. The remaining facts as to whether the Managing Trustee was not authorized to file the present suit on account of the fact that he had been removed as Managing Trustee by a resolution dated 22.04.2009 and as to the reasons for his removal, these are matters which have to be decided upon after evidence is adduced by both the parties. Application dismissed.
Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Since the entire action instituted by the plaintiff-trust is on the basis that the defendants have started manufacturing and marketing various types of fans using the impugned trademark 'CINNI that already stood assigned to the plaintiff-Trust, the interim orders passed by this Court on 1st May, 2009, restraining the defendant No. 2 from interfering with the business of the plaintiff in terms of the assignment deed dated 05.11.2000 and further restraining the said defendant from transferring the impugned trademark 'CINNI that stood assigned to the plaintiff-trust by the aforesaid assignment deed in favour of any third party except the plaintiff-trust, appear to be wholly justified, and are made absolute.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Sections 16 to 20

Territorial Jurisdiction ingredients to exercise territorial jurisdiction indicated.
HELD The mere fact that a website is accessible in a particular place may not itself be sufficient for the courts of that place to exercise personal jurisdiction over the owners of the website. However, where the website is not merely passive but is interactive permitting the users not only to have access to the contents thereof but, also subscribe to the services provided by the owners / operators, may in certain circumstances create jurisdiction in the court of that place where the website is accessible. Where the website is interactive, the level of interactivity becomes relevant and in cases of limited interactivity such interactivity may not be sufficient for a court to exercise jurisdiction. [Para 11]
In the present case, the website www.expresspharmapulse.com containing the information of the defendant company and also information regarding the drug Tadarich is passive in nature. It has no section for subscription to its services and the options which could be exercised by subscriber. This information in no manner can be said to be inviting any subscription from anyone including the consumers. [Para 15]
It is pertinent to mention here that the defendant company has dis-continued with its product "Tadarich" and instead they are manufacturing drug Tadalafil in the brand name of Tadasip which does not include the alleged trade mark "CIALIS" owned by the plaintiff. [Para 16]
As discussed above, the website proved on the record does not indicate that the defendant invited any subscription from anyone including Delhi for supply of their product. [Para 18]
Therefore, it is concluded that the website containing the information of the defendant company and its product "Tadarich" in no manner can be said to be interactive permitting the users, not only access to the contents thereof but, also subscribe to the services provided by the defendant. Even if it is taken that a limited interactivity is there in the information, this by itself is not sufficient for this court to exercise its jurisdiction. [Para 19]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Appellants had unsuccessfully approached the High Court and Honble single judge dismissed application of plaintiffs for interim injunction for restrainig the defendants from use of trade mark SUNSTOP as it had transborder reputation.. Reported as 2009 (41) PTC 234(Mad.)
HELD By DB "multinational corporations, which have no intention of coming to India or introducing their product in India should not be allowed to throttle an Indian company by not permitting it to sell a product in India, if the Indian company has genuinely adopted the mark and developed the product and is first in the market. Thus the ultimate test should be, who is first in the market. In this case respondent passes the test.
Appellate court would not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material.
Appeal dismissed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2

Trade mark SUNSTOP used by plaintiffs defendants claming to have coined this word after research.
Action for passing off .
Crucial facts noted by court for grant of injunction "it is clear that the defendant's product arrived in the Indian market, earlier than the plaintiffs'. But the first plaintiffs product was earlier than that of the defendant's product in the world market."
Further held repelling the arguments of plaintiff for grant of injunction on basis of transborder reputation court held. " Even if the first plaintiff is presumed to have achieved a tansborder reputation, for the purpose of argument, the balance of convenience does not appear to be in favour of the plaintiffs for the grant of an order of injunction. As stated earlier, the defendant applied for the registration of the Trade Mark in India in August 2005 and obtained a Drug license in November 2005 and launched its product in May 2007. The plaintiffs have not produced any proof to show that they had any intention to appear in the Indian market till October 2007. There is no document to show that the plaintiffs had an intention to arrive, even in 2005 or 2006, but that by force of circumstances, they could actually arrive only in October 2007." it is hard to conceive that the first plaintiff had established a transborder reputation that entitle the plaintiffs to an order of injunction. The plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence to show that they had at least undertaken a blitzkrieg sales promotion campaign in India, at any time prior to the actual arrival of their product in November 2007 Application for injunction therefore dismissed.Section 10 CPC
"It is seen that the bar under Section 10 of the Code is only to the Court proceeding with the trial of the suit and not with the hearing of any interlocutory applications. This is clear even from the plain language of Section 10. It merely says "no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit".

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2
Permanent injunction restraining infringement of copyright, passing off, unfair competition, rendition of accounts, delivery up and damages.
In the present case, as mentioned by the plaintiff in the plaint that the plaintiff developed the idea of making animated mythological film on 'Ramayana' in the year 2004. The plaintiff has also filed the assignment deed dated 2nd February, 2005 between the plaintiff and Mr. Sarfaraj Ahmed who has assigned copyrights in the voice over, music and sound recording against consideration. The bill dated 4th January, 2005 is also filed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has similarly filed another assignment dated 17th June, 2006, 20th May, 2006 and 5th June, 2006 in respect of purchasing various rights for making the animated film 'Ramayana'.
On the other hand, although the defendant has raised the defence that defendant No. 5 has created the work on this animated film 'Ramayana' in the year 2005 however, no cogent evidence in this regard has been filed. The defendant has filed the copyright registration bearing CL No. 1103/2007 in respect of registration of the work. In column No. 9 of the registration certificate, it is mentioned that the work in question was first time published in the year 2007 which is apparently subsequent to work created by the plaintiff in the year 2005. Therefore, the registration is immaterial. The copyright registration is always granted on the basis of declaration made by the party before the copyright office, hence, registration referred by the defendant has no substance. Work in question was first time published in the year 2007 which is apparently subsequent to work created by the plaintiff in the year 2005. Therefore, the registration is immaterial.
The copyright registration is always granted on the basis of declaration made by the party before the copyright office, hence, registration referred by the defendant has no substance.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 —
"Where infringement is deliberate and wilful and the defendant acts fraudulently with knowledge that he is violating plaintiffs rights,essential elements of estoppel are lacking and in such a case the protection of plaintiffs rights by injunctive relief never is properly denied. "The doctrine of estoppel can only be invoked to promote fair dealings" Interim injunction, affirmed