Copyright Act, 1957

Section 62
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 —
Section 20

Cause of action not arisen in Delhi . The cause of action arose in Maharashtra only, where the plaintiffs principal office is located . Suit is maintainable at Maharashtra.

We have already mentioned the landmark and oft-quoted judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Roadways and Oil & Natural Gas Commission. We must also refer to a more comparatively recent decision in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Limited v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 where it has been enunciated that if only a small part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, it is not bound to entertain the petition. It would be sufficiently empowered to refer the petition to the court where substantially the cause of action has arisen as it would be more convenient to adjudicate the matter in that court. Although it was Section 20 of the CPC which was in focus in all those cases, it is the legal rationale behind it that had compelled the court to render a purposive interpretation thereto. This approach is exactly what is called for even where the Court is to interpret other statutes such as the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act. [Para 12]

In this analysis, we find the Appeal to be devoid of merits. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the cause of action, as laid out in the Plaint, has arisen in Maharashtra only, where the Plaintiff's principal office is located. Had it allegedly arisen at a place where the Plaintiff does not have its principal or subordinate office, the suit could have been filed in any Court holding territorial jurisdiction over any of its offices. Thus, it is evident that we are, in no wise, whittling down the provisions of either the Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act. We hold that if the cause of action has arisen at a place where the Plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, that place is not only the appropriate but also the only place where a suit can be instituted ventilating a grievance of violation of copyright, (and since the provisions are similar) to an infringement of the trade¬mark. In holding so we are not ignoring the provisions of either the Copyright Act or the Trade Marks Act; we are only imparting a pragmatic interpretation to them. [Para 13]